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The world financial crisis that started in the US housing market in 2008 brought into evidence deep failures of prudential oversight, linked for the most part to a failure to comprehend and handle systemic risk in a way that could prevent systemic crises. This paper summarizes the responses to the joint World Bank-ASBA survey o the state of systemic oversight in the Latin American and Caribbean financial sectors and reflects on some of the challenges identified by respondents. The authors found that there is broad consensus among regional This paper is a product of the Financial and Private Sector Department, Latin America and the Caribbean Region. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at egutierrez2@worldbank.org and pcaraballo@worldbank.org. financial authorities on the need to enhance the current systemic oversight framework. Improving consolidated supervision to mitigate risk-shifting in conglomerates, adjusting prudential regulations to account for the accumulation of systemic risks, redefining the role of the supervisor to make it more proactive, and improving coordination among local supervisors as well as with foreign supervisors figure preeminently in the regional reform agenda.
Introduction
The world financial crisis that started in the US housing market in 2008 brought into evidence deep failures of prudential oversight, linked for the most part to a failure to comprehend and handle systemic risk in a way that could prevent systemic crises. Systemic risk is defined as "a risk of disruption to financial services that is (i) caused by an impairment of all or parts of the financial system and (ii) has the potential to have serious negative consequences for the real economy" 2 . Systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) are those impending failure, inability to operate or disorderly wind down could produce systemic effects as defined above.
There are two dimensions to systemic risk; one relates to how risk is distributed in the financial system at a given point in time ("cross sectional dimension") while the other relates to how risks evolve over time ("temporal dimension") 3 . The current oversight framework focuses on individual institutions (microprudential framework) as opposed to the system as a whole (macroprudential framework).
A macroprudential approach to oversight has been proposed for some time with a view to manage systemic risk 4 and is now being developed by standard setters. From a cross sectional dimension (also denominated micro-systemic risk perspective), regulation focuses on (i) removing incentives for the accumulation of risks in certain types of intermediaries, including through the extension of regulatory perimeters and the homogenization of regulations across different intermediaries to avoid regulatory arbitrage, (ii) adjusting prudential requirements to take into account the systemic risk induce by the institution, (iii) improving safety net mechanisms to reduce moral hazard pose by SIFIs that are deemed too-big-to fail 5 . From a temporal dimension, regulatory efforts aim at mitigating procyclicality by preventing the building up of risks in the cycle upturn and creating buffers to cushion the downturn to avoid a credit crunch. On the supervisory front, efforts are directed to monitor interconnections between participants and common risk factors. Such approach requires close coordination between 3 financial sector supervisors and other financial sector authorities, especially monetary authorities.
The Latin America and Caribbean region (LAC), with the notable exceptions of some Caribbean countries affected by the failure of a complex insurance conglomerate, weathered the latest global financial crisis in part reflecting lessons learnt during past financial crisis as well as a somewhat different approach to oversight. Moreover, the credit cycle was not as pronounced as in the industrialized countries most affected by the crisis and public and private sector balance sheets were stronger than in past crisis episodes. However, as the region's financial systems become more complex and more tightly integrated with those of the rest of the world, the question remains as to whether it could become exposed to similar failures caused by homebred endogenous dynamics or increased vulnerability to external turbulence.
In a framework of collaboration between the World Bank (WB) and the Association of Supervisors of Banks of the Americas (ASBA), the two institutions partnered to prepare a survey and identify the state of systemic oversight frameworks in the region. The survey also intends to understand the perception of the region on the possible need for a reform program aimed at better capturing and addressing systemic risk. This paper summarizes the responses to the survey and reflects on some of the challenges identified by respondents. The paper is organized as follows:
section 2 provides a description of the survey; section 3 summarizes the main messages coming up from the survey; sections 4 to 9 provide a detailed description of the responses to the main sections of the survey; and section 10 provides some concluding thoughts.
Description of the Survey
To understand the regional perception on the importance of systemic oversight, the status of practices in the region and challenges going forward, the survey included questions on three broad topics: microprudential oversight, management of economic cycles, and questions related to macroprudential oversight. The survey was sent to all the LAC bank supervisory agencies that are members of ASBA. The head of banking supervision of the agency (from now on called supervisor) was asked to respond, and to forward the survey to the financial stability or research 4 department of the central bank (from now on referred as monetary authorities), even if not an ASBA member. Bank supervisors were asked to respond to questions related to microprudential and macroprudential oversight while monetary authorities were asked to respond to the questions related to management of economic cycles and macroprudential oversight. Bank supervisors could coordinate responses with other line supervisors (such as insurance, pensions or securities) but only one response would be send by country. Of the 31 countries members of ASBA in the LAC region, 19 supervisors and 9 central banks responded the survey (Annex 1).
The survey comprises 117 questions that seek to capture the basic framework and facts, as well as the authorities' views and plans, regarding the six following questions:
1. How important is it to enhance the current systemic oversight framework?
2. Is there a need for redefining the perimeter of regulation in order to help preventing excessive risk-taking behavior and limit the scope for regulatory arbitrage? 6. How effective is the inter-agency collaboration (between the central bank, the domestic supervisory agencies and the cross-border supervisory agencies) in assessing systemic risks and taking appropriate action when needed?
Main Survey Findings
There is broad consensus among regional financial authorities on the need to enhance the current systemic oversight framework. Latin American economies withstood reasonably well the recent financial crisis, but financial authorities in LAC see an increasing likelihood of occurrence of a systemic risk-induced financial crisis as systems develop and become more sophisticated. Most survey respondents indicated that enhancing supervisory capacity to assess systemic risks and to 5 identify risks in sophisticated products is a top priority, followed by the need to adjust prudential norms to account for systemic risk. Lastly, there are important challenges on cross border coordination to deal with systemic risk in the LAC region. The main sources of concern regarding systemic oversight are international financial groups and regional financial groups. Lack of effective arrangements for cross-border information exchange and discussion of common issues to deal with cross-border crisis, and for sharing the resolution costs of institutions operating cross-border are sources of concern among regional supervisors.
Relevance of Systemic Oversight Reform
Financial authorities in LAC see that the likelihood of occurrence of a systemic risk-induced financial crisis increases as systems develop and become more sophisticated. Most Latin American supervisors and monetary authorities think unlikely that a financial crisis similar to the one recently experienced in the US could happen in their countries under the current stage of financial development. However, as the system evolves in sophistication, over 50 percent of the respondents consider somewhat likely that a US-type crisis could happen in their countries ( Figure 1 ). Over 80 percent of respondents pointed to limited exposure to subprime assets and toxic US assets as important or extremely important reasons for their financial system resilience.
More than half also thought that a simpler financial system with limited global integration and a stricter approach to prudential oversight had helped.
Most respondents felt the latest world cycle did not complicate much local prudential management ( Figure 1 Mobilizing support for the necessary legal and institutional reforms, getting a clearer vision of the issues and alternatives and boosting cross-agency coordination are also viewed as pressing issues.
Regulatory Perimeters in LAC and Scope for Regulatory Arbitrage
Despite cases, capital adequacy ratio in 11 cases and provisions in 12. In 2 countries out of the 7 in which off-shore banks operate, they are not subject to CAR or provisions regulations, and in one case, off-shore banks are not subject to minimum paid in capital. In the case of investment funds, about 50 percent of respondents indicated they had liquidity requirements for mutual funds, mostly in the form of liquidity requirements for money market funds, although in some cases there are also limits on redemption. Several countries indicate that the activity is restricted to the type of license granted; however, many intermediaries can grant loans or invest. In the case of Chile, for example, insurance companies can grant retail loans -a common practice in several countries by which insurance companies lend using the insurance policy as collateral-but are supervised by the superintendence of Securities and Insurance instead of the Banking Superintendence, which supervises other lending institutions. Only in the case of commercial banks does prudential regulation take into account the size of contingent liabilities. For most other intermediaries it is unusual. Also, respondents indicated that no domestic bank can set an off-shore bank and operate with residents under different prudential regulations.
Powers to regulate conglomerates do not appear comprehensive. In 40 percent of countries, banking groups (BG) or financial conglomerates (FC) exclude non-financial group entities. Most 14 supervisors indicated they can presume which companies belong to the FC (80 percent).
However, only in 30 percent of respondent countries a financial holding company (FHC) has to be created to control all of their financial sector activities. Moreover, FHC can in the majority of cases be created abroad and in those cases it would be under foreign supervision. Related party limits are a widespread tool to reduce exposure from the bank to the rest of the FC or economic group. Permissible activities and larger exposure limits are also applied in about 2/3 of the cases while ownership limits in about half of cases (Figure 3 ). In more than half of the countries there is no special capital requirement for financial groups. Some countries seem to have interpreted this as powers over the holding company (in cases where the holding has to be constituted) and others seem to interpret the group as the bank and their subsidiaries. Powers over conglomerates do not appear to be more extensive in LAC 5 countries where 4 out of 5 countries don't have capital requirements over the group in comments to the questions. However, for example in the case of Mexico there is an agreement of responsibility by the holding with regards to the losses of its subsidiaries 13 . About 70 percent of countries consider the financial group (understood in most cases as a bank and its subsidiaries) when setting capital requirements; they set them either on a fully consolidated basis, or set requirements for both the group and the individual institutions.
Supervisors and monetary authorities perceive substantial scope for regulatory arbitrage, particularly across regulated and unregulated institutions as well as across borders. More than 50 percent of respondents thought such issues to be very or extremely important, even though regulatory perimeters are wide as previously discussed (Figure 3 ). Arbitrage among institutions belonging to the same group and financial intermediaries with different licenses was perceived also as important by about 50 percent of respondents. Accordingly, the most pressing perimeter issues relate to risk-shifting among conglomerates, both cross border and domestic. Other perimeter issues associated with accumulation of opaque liabilities including through derivatives by real sector corporations, over the counter trading of derivatives activities and provision of 13 The financial group's holding company is responsible for all and every liability and/or losses (defined as an inability to meet its obligations due to lack of assets) of its subsidiaries. In the event of simultaneous defaults, the group should respond for its bank's liabilities first, and only the deal with the issues concerning the rest of its subsidiaries on a pro-rata basis. For their part, subsidiaries charter's are required to explicitly state that they will not be held responsible for losses of their holding company or those of fellow subsidiaries within the group. services by unlicensed intermediaries were also perceived as important by at least 50 percent of respondents.
Credit cooperatives and insurance companies are institutions for which respondents think that is most important to strengthen regulation for systemic concerns (Figure 3) . About 50 percent of respondents also indicated it would be important as well for investment vehicles (pension, money market and mutual funds). Only five countries out of the 19 that responded are considering adjusting regulation to take into account the systemic importance of the institution, although many more have not ruled out doing so. Supervision is more commonly adjusted to this fact, but mostly on a preliminary basis.
Cross-Sectional Regulation of Systemic Risk
Regulation of systemic liquidity risk is still relatively incipient in LAC. that require banks to have contingency planning in the event of systemic liquidity shocks, and increased liquidity requirements for foreign exchange liabilities or for example prior to an election when systemic risks are perceived to be higher. The incorporation of systemic liquidity concerns in capital is virtually non-existent. One of the respondents that indicated some form of requirement was in place referred to the capacity of the supervisor to require additional capital in reaction to risks that could affect the bank solvency (and thus its capacity to repay deposits).
Capital charges in LAC are uniform across banks, and do not vary with the size of the institution, interconnectedness or other factor that determines its contribution to systemic risk. Uruguay and Peru indicated that they are considering imposing additional capital surcharges for systemic risk.
14 Only 20 percent of monetary authorities answered such distinction existed. What is the liability base on which deposit insurance premia are calculated?
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In the case of Uruguay the surcharge under consideration will depend on the size of uninsured deposits and the size of international reserves available for the lender of last resort. In only about 40 percent of countries do capital charges for counterparty credit risk vary depending on whether the counterparty is a regulated financial intermediary or unregulated.
Financial innovation is typically regulated in the region. About 60 percent of supervisors including most LAC 5 countries) indicated that they have powers to authorize new financial products or regulate existing ones. The majority of supervisors also indicated that they plan to introduce in the near future changes to the governance framework of financial intermediaries as a result of the global financial crisis (Figure 4 ). Some countries refer to the need to strengthen bank boards and improve fit and proper criteria for banks. Mexico noted that it has agreed to adopt the principles and standards issued by the Financial Stability Board regarding executive compensation. The central bank of Brazil has drafted a document on executive compensation schemes which is under consultation. Several countries indicate the willingness to comply with any newly issued international standards for corporate governance.
Deposit insurance schemes still need to be developed in several Latin American countries and price of insurance does not reflect contributions to systemic risks. As previously indicated, about 40 percent of countries, mostly Caribbean and Central American do not have deposit insurance schemes in place. Deposit insurance premium typically only include deposits (exclusively insured deposits in half of cases). Countries are not considering charging a premium over liabilities other than deposits or adjust the premium charged in relation to the systemic risk posed by the institution.
Dynamic Systemic Regulation
Almost all monetary authorities indicated their interest rate policy is not sufficient to control credit cycles and asset bubbles, and several respondents indicated to have used other policy instruments as well. In some cases, given official dollarization, the central bank is not in control of interest rates. Some other countries indicated that excess liquidity in the financial system reduces the effectiveness of interest rate policy as banks do not need to borrow from the central bank. Other countries also pointed to the difficulties to detect asset bubbles. Four out of the nine 19 respondents have used reserve requirements. They are perceived as quite successful instrument, particularly in the downturns. Two countries reported to use capital controls in the last 10 years to preserve financial stability. They were perceived at least moderately successful in diminishing exchange rate volatility and in shifting the maturity of foreign liabilities towards longer terms.
There is wide variety of opinions among monetary authorities and supervisors on how strong is the case for having macroprudential tools to help control credit cycles and asset bubbles. About a third in each group of respondents sees a strong case, a moderate case and no case respectively 
20
Peru and Uruguay) and two other countries are considering their introduction. Virtually no country has ruled out introducing them at a future stage. Regarding countercyclical lending norms, such as loan-to-value ratios or haircuts in repos, no country in the region has introduced them, albeit slightly over half of respondents indicated they have not ruled them out (including all LAC 5 supervisors).
Financial authorities noted that the effectiveness of such measures needs to be further studied and pointed to several implementation challenges. In most cases the introduction of the countercyclical measures has been relatively recent. Thus, supervisors and monetary authorities in these countries tend to think it is early to fully assess the success of existing countercyclical norms. One of the supervisors also noted that it was difficult to assess the impact of the countercyclical prudential norm in isolation from the rest of the regulatory framework.
Respondents indicated that technical difficulties, institutional difficulties and implementation challenges are equally important factors that need to be addressed to introduce countercyclical norms. One country mentioned that lack of statistical records complicated the calibration necessary for the design of the norm. Supervisors in two countries mention difficulties in getting the industry to accept the proposals given their lobbying capacity and in reaching agreement with the industry in the rules during the consultation process.
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Systemic Risk Supervision and Challenges
There is substantial scope for improvements in systemic risk supervision in LAC. The majority of respondents thought that there should be a fundamental redefinition of the role and functions of the supervisor and making it more proactive, at least to some extent. Only about 15 percent of respondents did not think any reform was necessary ( Figure 6 ). Some supervisors emphasized the need to decisively change the traditional scope of supervision to become more risk-based. Several of them also indicated that supervisors should be more proactive and adopt pre-emptive measures to preserve financial instability when perceived risks are building up. Supervisory agencies should then clarify their strategies and mechanisms to deal with such risks. It was also noted that there may be excessive reliance on rating agencies and that it is necessary that some agency be willing to tackle asset price bubbles. Monetary authorities commented on the need to adopt a macroprudential approach both in regulation and Frameworks to monitor sources of cross-sectional systemic risk still need to be developed in many countries. Less than a fourth of respondents felt that housing market monitoring was good and none thought it was excellent ( Figure 6 ). About 20 percent of respondents indicate they do not monitor housing market developments. Only one monetary authority thought its monitoring of this market was good. Supervisors noted that lack of good and reliable data on housing prices hampered monitoring albeit several supervisors indicated that housing credit markets remained underdeveloped, limiting the scope for systemic risk build up. Over the counter derivatives markets are not monitored by half of the respondents whom indicated that such markets were not significant in their jurisdictions. Only LAC 5 countries reported having active derivative markets and all supervisors in these countries thought that their monitoring was good and that the monetary authorities collected and reported data on transactions periodically to supervisors. Only a fourth of respondents indicated that their monitoring of regulatory arbitrage across groups or institutions with different licenses was good or excellent ( Figure 6 ). Off-balance sheet activities are monitored by all respondents and only 20 percent thought it needed strengthening. Regarding new and/or sophisticated products and services, only about a fifth of respondents thought that their ability to assess inherent risks was good (none thought it was excellent).
Supervisory powers to request additional buffers to account for systemic risks appear limited in several jurisdictions. About 40 percent of respondents indicated that their powers for requesting that an institution increases its capital, provisions, or liquidity based on their exposure to systemic risk was poor or non-existent (Figure 7) . The main hindrance to the use of supervisory discretion is the agency's legal mandate. About 40 percent of respondents indicated that political pressures and industry pressures were an important factor and 30 percent pointed also to lack of legal protection. About 3/4 of respondents indicated that the civil code was not important factor.
One supervisor also noted that the complexity of the issues involved in measuring systemic risk made it difficult to get precise measures on which to base additional prudential requirements.
Most respondents indicated that market discipline should be strengthened at least to some extent, What in your view is the most important hindrance to the use of supervisory discretion?
Inter-agency collaboration to monitor and manage systemic risk
There is a variety of arrangements in LAC regarding who is responsible for setting prudential regulation. In about a third of countries the mandate for setting prudential regulation is with the central bank, while in another third with the superintendence (Figure 8 ). In Brazil, Guatemala, The stability of the financial system is a collaborative effort between various regulatory bodies.
In the majority of the countries, the central bank has a mandate to maintain financial stability (15 out of 19 countries), together with the supervisor authority (9 countries) and/or the ministry of finance (Figure 8 ). In countries with monetary boards this institution is entrusted with this task.
Most respondents indicated that the mandate is explicitly defined, although the term financial stability is not always explicitly mentioned but instead there are references to preserve the value of the currency and the stability of external and internal payments. Over 70 percent of the respondent countries have financial stability departments in the central bank. 
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Please rate the relative importance of the following potential cross-border sources of concern regarding systemic oversight: Who has the mandate for setting prudential regulation?
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(ii) the lack of effective arrangements to discuss common issues between home and host supervisors (61 percent); (iii) the lack of effective cross-border inspections (57 percent); and (iv) the lack of effective arrangements for sharing the resolution costs of institutions operating crossborder (50 percent).
Summary and Conclusions
Supervisors and monetary authorities in LAC, both in large and small countries, are increasingly focused on improving systemic oversight. The concern of the authorities with potential build up of systemic risks is warranted. While financial systems in LAC remain underdeveloped in terms of size and the complexity of products taken, a wide variety of financial intermediaries already operate in most countries. Large cross-border conglomerates with complex structures and institutions that because of their size or interconnectedness can be considered systemically important already dominate the landscape in several countries. At the onset of the global financial crisis, new and unexpected channels of contagion among institutions and markets manifested. In Mexico for example, a corporate default arising from exposure to exotic FX derivatives froze the commercial market paper in turn affecting firms refinancing capacity which could have prompted further corporate defaults. In Brazil, the central bank engaged in substantial liquidity injections, in part to counter the "drain" associated with the fact that banks had to place additional liquidity at their accounts in the central counterparty clearing house to cover heightened margin calls. The failure of CL financial, a large complex regional conglomerate with interests in insurance, banking, energy, agriculture and real estate and operations in several countries has had substantial impact in the Caribbean. Going forward, a key challenge for LAC (as elsewhere) would be reforming the current oversight and safety net structure to account for the accumulation of systemic risks.
There is a comprehensive agenda of regulatory reforms being considered by LAC financial authorities to improve systemic risk oversight. Such reforms include the adoption of macroprudential regulations (i.e. adjusting prudential norms to account for cross-sectional systemic risk making prudential norms more counter-cyclical), as well as the adoption of regulation that limits the scope for regulatory arbitrage within conglomerates, including cross-31 border ones. Regulatory perimeters are widely set in LAC and their redefinition is not a top priority at this time. Nevertheless supervisors perceive important opportunities for regulatory arbitrage for institutions outside the perimeter and indicate that they plan to extend the perimeter to hitherto unregulated institutions (such as cooperatives). Improving the safety net, the accounting framework and enhancing transparency are also considered important reform agenda items.
In tandem, there is an important institutional reform agenda to ensure the effectiveness of systemic oversight. Enhancing supervisory capacity to assess systemic risks and to identify risks in sophisticated products is the top priority for supervisors and monetary authorities in the region. Key aspects of the institutional reform also include redefining the role and functions of the supervisor to make it more proactive and enhancing supervisory powers to take discretionary action to reduce systemic risks. Finally, it is essential to improve cross-agency and cross-border coordination. The stability of the financial system is a collaborative effort between various regulatory bodies which requires enhanced coordination between supervisors and the central bank as well as among different line supervisors. Improved crossed border coordination is necessary to deal with risks associated to the operations of international and regional conglomerates are also pressing issuers.
While the agenda is clearly defined, implementing reforms will require substantial efforts. To keep up with fast-evolving markets and products it will be essential to boost supervisory capacity and resources. Mobilizing support for the necessary legal and institutional reforms and getting a clearer vision of the issues and alternatives are also viewed as pressing issues. Multilateral institutions and supervisory associations could play a useful role to help in the implementation process enabling continuous capacity building, providing guidance on international best practices and helping mobilize support for implementation reform. Please rate the im po rtance o f the fo llo wing additio nal po tential perim eter issues:
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